The "new approach" to applications for extensions of time to appeal 28 January 2015 Thomas-Crockett case report, court of appeal, cpr, Jackson reforms, procedure, Appeals (0) A recent judgment of the Court of Appeal has extended the spectre of the robustness of the 'Jackson Reforms' yet further. Although the approach courts now take is somewhat softer following the Court of Appeal's judgment in Denton, there is no doubting that the earlier decision in Mitchell has changed the landscape of litigation, at least in cases where concession or relief is sought and where default is a factor. Much like the aforementioned cases, known by the name of the most easily-remembered party, the conjoined appeals of Regina (Hysai) v Secretary of State for the Home Department / Fatollohipour v Alibadibenisi / May v Robinson (2015) The Times Law Reports 22/1/15, are likely to be most easily referred to (for obvious reasons) by the names of the parties to the final appeal. Here, Moore-Bick LJ giving the concurred-with judgment of the court (Tomlinson LJ and King J), held that retrospective applications for extensions of time for filing a notice of appeal should be treated in the same way as an application for relief from sanctions and that the court should take a similarly rigorous approach to the same. This notwithstanding, the Court was particularly at pains to point out that such a robust approach should not encourage parties to act unreasonably and refusing to cooperate in the hope that this will provide a litigation advantage. The court proffered the following guidance relevant to appeals in civil cases: shortage of funds was not a good reason for a delay; the fact a person was a litigant in person was of no significance when the court assessed the seriousness and significance of a failure to comply with rules and directions of the court. The more important question was whether it amounted to a good reason for the failure which occurred. This will depend on the specific facts of a case, however the mere fact of being a litigant in person did not afford good reason for default; and the court should usually decline to hear argument as to the underlying merits of the appeal, other than in cases where the merits were patently either very strong or very weak, as to do so routinely would unreasonably use up unnecessary court time and drive up costs.